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PLAIN ERROR RULE-CLARIFYING
PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS UNDER
RULE 52(b) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Olano,I the United States Supreme Court held
that the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was
not an error that the court of appeals could correct under Rule
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 The Court ar-
ticulated a four-step analysis of plain error review under Rule
52(b).3 It decided that under that analysis, the defendants needed
to show that the presence of alternates during deliberations
prejudiced their defense, either specifically or presumptively, before
a reviewing court could correct the error pursuant to the Rule.4 Af-
ter rejecting the court of appeals' determination that the error was
"inherently prejudicial," the Court found that the defendants did
not meet their burden of showing prejudice and that the appellate
court therefore had no authority to reverse the defendants'
convictions. 5
After reviewing the history of plain error review as it has
evolved from the common law to Rule 52(b), this Note argues that
Olano was a poor case to use to clarify plain error review. This Note
then examines the purpose of the plain error rule and argues that
Olano, by rejecting the miscarriage of justice standard for applying
Rule 52(b), disserves this purpose. Finally, this Note evaluates the
Court's application of Rule 52(b) to the Respondents' case, arguing
that the Court's ad hoc approach is consistent with the history and
1 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993).
2 Id. at 1781.
3 Id. at 1777-79.
4 Id. at 1780.
5 Id. at 1781.
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purpose of the Rule but inconsistent with the Court's more ambi-
tious goal of drawing an analytical blueprint of plain error review.
II. BACKGROUND
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
drafted as a restatement of the common law. 6 The United States
Supreme Court recognized the "plain error doctrine," the common
law predecessor of Rule 52(b), at least as far back as 1896. In Wiborg
v. United States,7 Chief Justice Fuller stated that "if a plain error was
committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel our-
selves at liberty to correct it" even though the defendants in the case
had not "duly excepted" to the error at trial.8 The Court reaffirmed
this formulation of the doctrine in Clyatt v. United States,9 stating that
although defendant's counsel did not make a motion for the jury to
find the defendant not guilty, Wiborg allowed the Court to determine
whether a plain error had been committed "in a matter so vital to
the defendant."' 0
Forty years after Wiborg, the Court offered a different articula-
tion of the plain error doctrine. In United States v. Atkinson," the
Court explained that "[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in
criminal cases, appellate courts... may, of their own motion, notice
errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvi-
ous, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation ofjudicial proceedings."1 2 The Atkinson Court did
not cite or discuss Wiborg, but the Atkinson standard seemed to shift
the focus of plain error inquiry from the impact of the error on the
defendant to the impact of the error on the judicial process.'
3
Rule 52(b) codified the plain error rule in still different terms,
providing that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
6 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) advisory committee's note ("This rule is a restatement
of existing law .... ).
7 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
8 Id. at 658-59. The Court reviewed the record of the case and decided that the two
defendants should have been acquitted of the charges against them: "We are of the
opinion that adequate proof.., is not shown by the record, and that as the case stood
the jury should have been instructed to acquit them." Id. at 659. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 128-31.
9 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
10 Id. at 221-22 (citing Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 658). As in Wiborg, the Clyalt Court re-
viewed the record and decided that the evidence did not support the verdict. Id. at 222.
11 297 U.S. 157 (1936).
12 Id. at 160.
13 See infra part V.B.
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the court."14 The Rule did not explain or define the concepts of
"plain error" or "affecting substantial rights," although the advisory
committee's notes indicated that the Rule was meant to codify the
doctrine articulated in Wiborg.15
In United States v. Frady,16 the Supreme Court addressed the
plain error rule as codified in Rule 52(b).1 7 Frady involved a motion
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 225518 seeking to vacate Joseph Frady's first
degree murder conviction on the grounds that the trial court's jury
instructions erroneously required the jury to presume malice,
thereby eliminating any chance Frady had of securing a manslaugh-
ter conviction.1 9 The Court held that Rule 52(b) did not apply to
prisoners bringing collateral attacks against criminal convictions.20
Although the Court did not apply Rule 52(b) in Frady, the majority
did note in dicta that the Rule "grants the courts of appeals the lati-
tude to correct particularly egregious errors on appeal regardless of
a defendant's trial default." 21 The Court explained that "Rule 52(b)
was intended to afford a means for the prompt redress of miscar-
riages ofjustice" 22 and noted approvingly that the courts of appeals
have "recognized that the power granted to them by Rule 52(b) is to
be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscar-
riage of justice would otherwise result."'23
In United States v. Young,24 the Court reiterated Frady's "miscar-
riage of justice" standard for applying Rule 52(b) and added that
"[a]ny unwarranted extension of this exacting definition of plain er-
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Rule 52 provides:
(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) PLAIN ERROR. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
15 FED. R. GRIM. P. 52(b) advisory committee's note. The note specifically cites Wi-
borg after explaining that the Rule is a restatement of existing law.
16 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
17 Id. at 163.
18 Section 2255 provides in relevant part:
[A] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
19 Frady, 456 U.S. at 158.
20 Id. at 166.
21 Id at 163.
22 Id. (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Court also cited the Atkinson
formulation of the plain error doctrine. Id. at 163 n.13.
23 Id. at n.14 (citing United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980) and
United States v. DiBenedetto, 542 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1976)).
24 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
10671994]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ror would skew the Rule's 'careful balancing of our need to en-
courage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first
time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be
promptly redressed.' "25 The respondent in Young had appealed his
convictions of mail fraud and making false statements to a govern-
ment agency on the ground that the prosecutor's closing statement
unfairly prejudiced him.26 Since Young had not objected to the re-
marks at trial, the Court determined that the principal issue in the
case was whether the prosecutor's comments constituted "plain er-
ror" that a reviewing court could correct absent timely objection. 27
The majority in Young quoted both the Atkinson and the miscarriage
of justice standards in describing plain error review under Rule
52(b), indicating that the Court considered the two standards to be
synonymous. 28 The Young Court emphasized that "a reviewing
court cannot properly evaluate a case [for plain error under Rule
52(b)] except by viewing such a claim against the entire record."
29
Explaining that " 'each case necessarily turns on its own facts,' "so
the Court decided that in light of the facts presented in Young, the
prosecutor's remarks did not "rise to the level of plain error."3 1
The Young Court also maintained that the federal appellate
courts had "consistently interpreted" the plain error doctrine to re-
quire a two-part inquiry.3 2 According to the Court, the appellate
courts' interpretation of Rule 52(b) required them to determine first
whether the error seriously affected substantial rights and then
whether the error had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's de-
liberations.33 Only after such an analysis, the Court maintained,
25 Id. at 15 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163).
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) and United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)).
29 Id. at 16.
30 Id. (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 16 n.14.
33 Id. Young's suggestion that appellate courts have "consistently interpreted" the
plain error rule is misleading. As Professor Charles Alan Wright has noted in his discus-
sion of appellate court treatment of Rule 52(b), there are "no 'hard and fast classifica-
tions in either the application of the principle or the use of a descriptive title.' " 3A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting
Dupoint v. United States, 388 F.2d 39, 45 (5th Cir. 1968)). For examples of appellate
court cases that do not apply the two-step plain error analysis outlined in Young, see
United States v. Stout, 667 F.2d 1347, 1354 (1 lth Cir. 1982); United States v. McCaskill,
676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018 (1982); Eaton v. United States,
398 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968); Page v. United States, 282
F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 1960). See also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 26.5 (1984) ("Opinions frequently stress that 'no talismanic method
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could appellate courts "conclude that the error undermined the
fairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice.
'34
Although the Court characterized this two-part analysis favorably, it
did not mandate that reviewing courts follow such an approach
when applying the Rule.35
In United States v. Olano, the Court for the first time set forth a
framework for plain error review under Rule 52(b) and addressed
the differences between the Atkinson and the miscarriage of justice
standards for correcting errors under the Rule.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1986, Guy W. Olano, Jr. and Raymond M. Gray were in-
dicted on numerous federal charges for participating in an intricate
scheme to defraud several savings and loan institutions. 36 Olano
was the chairman of Alliance Federal Savings and Loan Association
in Kenner, Louisiana, and Gray was the chairman of Home Savings
and Loan Association in Seattle, Washington.37 The jury trial of
Olano, Gray, and five co-defendants began in the Western District
of Washington on March 2, 1987.38 During pretrial proceedings,
the parties agreed that fourteen jurors-twelve regular jurors and
two alternates-would hear the case.39 The prosecution and the de-
fense each reserved one peremptory challenge to be used at the end
of the trial.40 The two jurors challenged at the end of the trial were
to be the alternates. 4
1
On May 26, near the end of the three-month trial, District
Court Judge Barbara J. Rothstein suggested to the defendants that
the two alternate jurors be allowed to remain with the regular jurors
during deliberations:
My last question, and I'd just like you to think about it, you have a day,
let me know, it's just a suggestion and you can-if there is even one
person who doesn't like it we won't do it, but it is a suggestion that
other courts have followed in long cases where jurors have sat through
a lot of testimony, and that is to let the alternates go in but not partici-
exists for determining plain error,' and each case must be examined on its own facts.")
(footnote and citations omitted).
34 Young, 470 U.S. at 16 n.14.
35 Id.
36 United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1774 (1993).
37 United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1991).
38 Brief for Respondent Guy W. Olano, Jr. at 2, United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct.
1770 (1993) (No. 91-1306) [hereinafter Brief for Olano].
39 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1774.




pate, but just to sit in on deliberations. 4 2
The next day, the court raised the issue again, and the following
cryptic colloquy took place:
THE COURT: [H]ave you given any more thought as to whether you
want the alternates to go in and not participate, or do you want them
out?
MR. ROBISON [counsel for Gray]: We would ask they not.
THE COURT: Not. 4 3
One day later, on the last day of the trial, the court again asked
whether the defendants agreed to the court's proposal to allow the
alternate jurors to sit in on deliberations:
THE COURT: Well, counsel, I received your alternates. Do I under-
stand that the defendants now-it's hard to keep up with you, Counsel.
It's sort of a day by day-but that's all right. You do all agree that all
fourteen deliberate?
[No record of response.]
Okay. Do you want me to instruct the two alternates not to participate
in deliberation?
MR. KELLOGG [counsel for co-defendant Hilling]: That's what I was
on my feet to say. It's my understanding that the conversation was the
two alternates go back there instructed that they are not to take part in
any fashion in the deliberations.
4 4
All three discussions concerning the alternate jurors took place
outside the presence of the jury but in the presence of both Gray's
counsel and Olano's counsel.4 5 Gray was present at all three discus-
sions, but Olano, who attended the first two, may not have attended
the third.4 6 At the end of the final day of the trial the court told the
jury: "[W]hat we would like to do in this case is have all of you go
back so that even the alternates can be there for the deliberations,
but according to the law, the alternates must not participate in the
deliberations. ' 4 7 The court then announced the identity of the al-
ternate jurors, and thejury retired to deliberate. 48 The next day the
court excused one of the alternate jurors at the juror's request, but
the other alternate remained with the jury throughout the
deliberations.
49
On June 3, 1987, the jury returned a verdict convicting Olano
on eight of the nine counts with which he was charged and Gray on
42 Id.
43 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1774.








all eight of the counts with which he was charged. 50 Gray and Olano
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.51 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was
insufficient to convict Olano on two counts and Gray on three
counts.52 The court vacated the convictions on the remaining
counts after determining that the presence of alternate jurors dur-
ing jury deliberations was reversible error under Rules 24(c) and
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 3 Because the
defendants did not object to the alternates' presence, the court of
appeals applied a "plain error analysis" under Rule 52. 54 The court
decided that Rule 24(c) prohibits alternate jurors from attending
deliberations unless the defendants personally consent on the rec-
ord to a waiver of their right to exclude alternate jurors from jury
deliberations. 55 Since the district court did not obtain "individual
waivers" from each defendant agreeing to the presence of alternate
jurors during deliberations, the court of appeals held that the dis-
trict court violated Rule 24(c). 56 The court then went on to hold
that such a violation was "inherently prejudicial," stating that "facial
expressions, gestures or the like" may affect the decision of one or
more jurors and that "[t]he presence of alternate jurors, even if they
are instructed not to participate, infringes upon the jury's privacy
and the secrecy of the jury process."5 7 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the violation of Rule 24(c) "require[d] a reversal of the
verdict" under the plain error doctrine of Rule 52(b). 58
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari59 on May
18, 1992 to "clarify the standard for 'plain error' review by the
Courts of Appeals under Rule 52(b)." 60
50 Brief for Olano at 4, Olano (No. 91-1306).
51 United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1991).
52 Id- at 1428.
53 I'd. Rule 24(c) provides in part that "[an alternate juror who does not replace a
regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(c).
54 Olano, 934 F.2d at 1436.
55 Id. at 1436-37.
56 Id at 1438.
57 Id. (citing United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir.
1964)).
58 Id at 1439.
59 United States v. Olano, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992).
60 United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
After reviewing the facts of the case, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority,61 explained that Rule 52(b) "provides the Courts
of Appeals with a limited power to correct errors that were forfeited
because not timely raised in the District Court."'62 Justice O'Connor
then examined the basic principles of such "plain error review" with
a four-step analysis of Rule 52(b).63 According to this analysis, Rule
52(b) requires that there be an "error," that the error be "plain,"
and that the error " 'affec[t] substantial rights' " before courts may
correct the error.64 The fourth step in the analysis is the application
of a "standard" to guide appellate courts' exercise of remedial dis-
cretion under the Rule.
6 5
In analyzing the first element, Justice O'Connor stated that
"[d]eviation from a legal rule is 'error' unless the rule has been
waived." 66 Waiver, Justice O'Connor noted, is not forfeiture.
67
Forfeiture is "the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,"
whereas waiver is the " 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.' "68 Justice O'Connor also noted that forfeiture,
unlike waiver, does not extinguish "errors" under the plain error
rule.69 She concluded that if the district court violated a legal rule
during trial proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the
rule, then there is an "error" within the meaning of Rule 52(b).
70
The Court explained the second element by noting simply that
"plain" is synonymous with both "clear" and "obvious," and that
the appellate courts cannot correct errors under Rule 52(b) unless
those errors are "clear under current law."
71
The Court addressed the third element by stating that an error
"affect[ing] substantial rights" means in most cases that the error
was prejudicial; that is, that the error "affected the outcome of the
District Court proceedings. ' 7 2 The majority held that the defend-
61 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined.
62 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1776.
63 Id. at 1776-79.
64 Id. at 1777-78.
65 Id. at 1778-79.
66 Id. at 1777.
67 Id.




72 Id. at 1777-78.
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ant rather than the government bears the burden of showing preju-
dice. 73 While acknowledging that "It]here may be a special category
of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of their effect on
the outcome" of a case, Justice O'Connor declined to discuss this
special category of errors. 74 The Court also declined to decide
whether the defendant is always required to make a specific showing
of prejudice to satisfy the "substantial rights" prong of Rule 52(b),
indicating that the prejudice requirement applied in this case.
75
The majority then considered when a reviewing court should
correct errors pursuant to Rule 52(b). 76 Justice O'Connor noted
that Rule 52(b) is permissive rather than mandatory.77 According to
Justice O'Connor, Rule 52(b) gives courts of appeals the authority
to order the correction of plain errors affecting substantial rights,
but they are not required to do so. 7 8 She maintained that the Court
had articulated the standard that should guide appellate courts in
their "exercise of remedial discretion under Rule 52(b)" in United
States v. Atkinson.79 Quoting Atkinson, Justice O'Connor stated that
courts of appeals "should correct a plain forfeited error affecting
substantial rights if the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integ-
rity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "80 The Court
maintained that an error may seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of a judicial proceeding independent of a de-
fendant's innocence. Justice O'Connor noted that in Frady and
Young the Court had specified that reviewing courts should correct
plain errors under Rule 52(b) "in those circumstances in which a
miscarriage ofjustice would otherwise result." 8' Explaining that the
phrase "miscarriage of justice" means that the defendant is "actu-
ally innocent," the majority rejected the notion that a Rule 52(b)
remedy is warranted only to avoid miscarriages of justice.8 2
Having articulated a four-part outline of plain error review
under Rule 52(b), the Court applied the principles of that analysis to
the case of Olano and Gray.83 Justice O'Connor noted that allowing
alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations was "no doubt a devia-






79 Id. at 1779 (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936)).
80 Id (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160).
81 Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).




tion from Rule 24(c)" since the Rule explicitly provides that "'[a]n
alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be dis-
charged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.' "84 The Court
declined to decide, however, whether such a deviation was a "plain
error," noting that the United States had conceded that the devia-
tion was both "plain" and an "error. ' 85 The Court therefore fo-
cused exclusively on the "substantial rights" prong of Rule 52(b).8 6
In analyzing the substantial rights issue, Justice O'Connor de-
termined that "[t]he presence of alternate jurors during jury delib-
erations is not the kind of error that 'affect[s] substantial rights'
independent of its prejudicial impact."87 According to Justice
O'Connor, the presence of alternate jurors during the jury delibera-
tions does violate the "cardinal principle that the deliberations of
the jury shall remain private and secret," but such a violation does
not by itself warrant correction since the primary purpose of jury
privacy is to protect the deliberations from improper influence88
The important question, Justice O'Connor decided, is whether
the violation of Rule 24(c) "prejudiced respondents, either specifi-
cally or presumptively."8- 9 She noted that allowing alternate jurors
to sit in on deliberations might prejudice a defendant in two differ-
ent ways: the alternates might actually have participated in the de-
liberations; or the alternates' presence might have exerted a
"chilling" effect on the regular jurors.9 0 The Court held that Olano
and Gray did not show that the presence of the alternate jurors
prejudiced them in either of these ways. 9l The majority also refused
to presume prejudice, deciding that the court of appeals was incor-
rect in finding that the presence of alternates during jury delibera-
tions was "inherently prejudicial."-92 Justice O'Connor pointed out
that the two alternate jurors were "indistinguishable" from the reg-
ular jurors until the end of the trial and that the district court specif-
ically instructed the alternate jurors not to participate in the
deliberations.93 Quoting language from Francis v. Franklin,9 4 Justice
O'Connor stated that reviewing courts should presume that jurors




88 Id. at 1779-80 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note).
89 Id. at 1780.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1781.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
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strive to understand and follow the instructions given to them.95
The court of appeals in this case, therefore, should not have pre-
sumed that the district court's instructions were contravened. 96
Finally, the majority decided that the presence of alternate ju-
rors did not entail a "sufficient risk of 'chill' " to warrant a presump-
tion of prejudice.97 Having concluded that the respondents failed
to meet their burden of showing prejudice under Rule 52(b), the
Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit without deciding
whether the district court's violation of Rule 24(c) would have war-
ranted correction under the Atkinson standard.98
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief and enigmatic concurrence, Justice Kennedy joined
the majority opinion and added a statement expressing his "own
understanding" of the majority's holding.9 9 Justice Kennedy first
noted that the majority's opinion is carefully phrased to emphasize
that "burden of proof concepts are the normal or usual mode of
analysis of error under Rule 52."100 Presumably Justice Kennedy
was referring to the Court's discussion of the differences between
harmless error review under Rule 52(a) and plain error review
under Rule 52(b). The majority had explained that under Rule
52(a) the government has the burden of persuading the reviewing
court that the error was not prejudicial whereas under Rule 52(b)
the defendant carries that burden.'0 1 Justice Kennedy argued that
"other rules may apply where the aggrieved party has not raised the
issue," but he did not explain which rules may apply to such cases,
noting only that in most cases the aggrieved party will raise the al-
leged error on appeal.' 0 2 Justice Kennedy maintained that in "that
context" the majority's analysis was helpful because it gave "opera-
tive effect" to the differences in Rule 52 analysis between cases
where a party preserves an objection and cases where a party does
not. 103
Justice Kennedy also observed that the majority did not ques-
tion the assumption that permitting alternates in the jury room dur-




99 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100 Id at 1782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101 Id at 1778.
102 Id. at 1782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ing deliberations was "error."1 0 4 According to Justice Kennedy,
there are "good reasons" to suppose that Rule 24(c) is the result of
"ajudgment that our jury system should be given a stable and con-
stant structure, one that cannot be varied by a court with or without
the consent of the parties."10 5 Nevertheless, he agreed with the
Court that Rule 52(b) does not allow a party to withhold an objec-
tion to alternate jurors during jury deliberations and then "demand
automatic reversal" of the verdict. 106
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens10 7 argued that the dis-
trict court had a "clear and unqualified duty" to dismiss the two
alternate jurors at the end of the trial under Rule 24(c).108 Justice
Stevens disagreed with the majority's determination that Rule 24(c)
errors "affect substantial rights" only when the errors prejudice a
particular defendant. 10 9 According to the dissent, some errors con-
cerning the jury's "deliberative function" warrant reversal regard-
less of whether the defendant can show prejudice because it is
difficult to measure the effects of such errors on a jury's decision
and because the errors " 'undermin[e] the structural integrity of the
criminal tribunal itself.' "110 Justice Stevens maintained that such
errors may therefore " 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation ofjudicial proceedings.' "I1"
The dissent also noted that the phrase "substantial rights" ap-
pears in both Rule 52(a) and Rule 52(b)." t 2 On the assumption that
the phrase has "the same meaning" in both parts of Rule 52, Justice
Stevens argued that under the majority's understanding of "sub-
stantial rights," even a timely objection to the alternates' presence
during jury deliberations would not have mandated reversal. 1 3 Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the Rule 24(c) violation, according to the
majority's view, would have warranted only harmless-error review
since the majority believed that the error did not affect "substantial
104 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in dissent.
108 0lano, 113 S. Ct. at 1782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1782-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254,
263-64 (1986) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury
members)).
I I I Id. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.
157, 160 (1936)).
112 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rights."' 114 Justice Stevens believed that had the defendants ob-
jected to the alternates' presence, and had the district court never-
theless allowed the jurors to be present in the jury room, reversal of
the judgment "would have been the proper response, with or with-
out a showing of prejudice."'1 15 Since in this case the defendants did
not object to the alternates' presence during the trial, and since Jus-
tice Stevens considered the violation of Rule 24(c) an error that "af-
fected substantial rights," Justice Stevens argued that Rule 52(b)
required an inquiry into the appellate court's exercise of remedial
discretion.1 6 Noting that the courts of appeals are "allowed a wide
measure of discretion in the supervision of litigation" in their cir-
cuits, Justice Stevens stated that he was "not persuaded that the
Court of Appeals here abused its broad discretion" in reversing the
judgment of the district court for violating Rule 24(c).'
17
V. ANALYSIS
This Note evaluates the Court's attempt to clarify plain error
review under Rule 52(b). This Note first argues that Olano was an
ill-suited case for developing a four-part framework for Rule 52(b)
analysis. Since the Court decided the case by focusing on one nar-
row issue, most of the elements of plain error review set out in Olano
were unapplied and unnecessary to the resolution of the case. This
Note then examines the purpose of plain error review and argues
that Rule 52(b) is meant to allow appellate courts to correct miscar-
riages of justice. By abandoning the "miscarriage of justice" stan-
dard in favor of the Atkinson standard, the Court disserves the
underlying purpose of the Rule. Finally, this Note argues that the
Court's circumscribed treatment of the "affecting substantial rights"
element properly resolved the issue in Olano but failed to further the
Court's more ambitious goal of clarifying plain error review.
A. OLANO WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE CASE FOR SETTING OUT A
COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE OF RULE 52(b) ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Olano to "clarify the
standard for 'plain error' review" under Rule 52(b).l18 It is unclear
whether by "standard" the Court meant the general analytical
framework for applying Rule 52(b) or the principle that should
114 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Ida (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117 Id at 1783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 n.24 (1993)).
118 Id. at 1776.
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guide courts in their "exercise of remedial discretion" under the
Rule. 119 Under either interpretation, however, Olano was a poor
case to use for clarifying plain error review.
The central problem with using Olano as an instrument for clari-
fying Rule 52(b) is that, under Justice O'Connor's analysis, Olano
involved only one element of plain error review. According to Jus-
tice O'Connor, appellate courts applying Rule 52(b) needed to de-
termine whether there was an "error," whether the error was
"plain," whether the error "affected substantial rights," and
whether the error "seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings."' 120 In Olano itself, however, the
Court focused only on the substantial rights question.12 1 Since the
Court was able to resolve Olano without applying the three other
elements of plain error review, the Court's decision to discuss only
the substantial rights issue was simply an exercise of judicial re-
straint. The unfortunate result is that the Court's articulation of the
three other elements of plain error review is dicta that provides ap-
pellate courts with little guidance on how to apply Olano's new
framework for plain error review. Given the difficulty that appellate
courts have had in developing a cogent and consistent understand-
ing of "plain error," the Court's failure to apply the "plain" and
"error" prongs of its new test is especially troubling. 122 A case that
required an inquiry into the definitions of "plain" and "error" as
well as into the question of whether the error "seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"
would have been much more appropriate for clarifying the Court's
interpretation of the plain error rule.
B. OLANO MISCONSTRUES THE PURPOSE OF RULE 52(b)
The second significant problem with Olano is that the Court
misconstrues the purpose of Rule 52(b) and thereby adopts the
119 Id. at 1777-79. Since, in the remainder of the opinion, the Court consistently uses
"standard" to mean the principle that should guide an appellate court's exercise of re-
medial discretion (the "Atkinson standard," for example), that interpretation seems more
probable. See id. at 1779, 1781.
120 Id. at 1777-78.
121 Id. at 1778. The Court noted that the United States had conceded that the viola-
tion of Rule 24(c) was an "error" and had "essentially concede[d]" that the error was
"plain." Id. at 1777. Because the Court decided that the error did not affect substantial
rights, the Court did not consider whether the error would have warranted correction
under the Atkinson standard. Id. at 1781.
122 Professor Wright has noted that appellate court cases "give the distinct impression
that 'plain error' is a concept appellate courts find impossible to define, save that they
know it when they see it." 3A WRIGHT, supra note 33 § 856.
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wrong standard1 23 for correcting errors under the Rule. Rule 52(b),
as the Olano majority correctly noted, 124 was intended as a restate-
ment of the existing law of plain error review.1 25 As the Court itself
explained in Young, the Advisory Committee's Notes on the Federal
Rules indicate that Rule 52(b) restated existing law as set forth in
Wiborg v. United States.126 A close examination of the plain error doc-
trine in Wiborg reveals that the Olano Court should have adopted the
miscarriage ofjustice standard rather than the standard laid down in
Atkinson, which authorized the correction of errors that "seriously
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."1
27
In Wiborg, the defendants failed to make a "motion or request"
that the jury be instructed to acquit them.128 Although the defend-
ants did not properly raise the issue during the trial, the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions of two of the three defendants on
appeal, explaining that "if a plain error was committed in a matter so
absolutely vital to the defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct
it. ' 1129 The Wiborg Court made it clear that there was insufficient
proof on the record to convict the two defendants and that the trial
court should have instructed the jury to acquit them.' 30 The plain
error doctrine in Wiborg, therefore, allowed the Court to correct an
error that was "so absolutely vital" to the defendants that the de-
fendants were convicted on legally insufficient evidence.' 3 ' In the
eyes of the law, the defendants in Wiborg were innocent.
The Wiborg articulation of the plain error doctrine has mani-
fested itself in the "miscarriage of justice" standard that many ap-
pellate courts invoked when applying Rule 52(b). 132 In plain error
123 This Note uses "standard" to mean the principle "that should guide the exercise
of remedial discretion under Rule 52(b)." Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779. This standard for
applying Rule 52(b) is the fourth part of Olano's four-part analysis. Id. See supra note 119
and accompanying text.
124 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1776.
125 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
126 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 (1985) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)
advisory committee's note; Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896)).
127 United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
128 Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 658.
129 Id. (emphasis added). In Young, the Court misquotes "matter" as "manner."
Young, 470 U.S. at 15 n.12.
130 Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 659.
131 Id. Accord Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir.) (for courts to cor-
rect a plain error under Rule 52(b), the error must have been "likely to have made a
difference in the judgment, so that failure to correct it could result in a miscarriage of
justice, that is, in the conviction of an innocent person or the imposition of an erroneous
sentence"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 470 (1992); United States v. Frazier, 936 F.2d 262, 266
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analysis the phrase "miscarriage of justice" means "the conviction
of one who but for the error probably would have been acquit-
ted."' 33 Since the Wiborg Court reversed the convictions of two de-
fendants "who but for the error probably would have been
acquitted," the appellate courts that have invoked Rule 52(b) to pre-
vent a "miscarriage of justice" have simply applied the traditional
plain error doctrine as set forth in Wiborg.
An important policy consideration underlies the "miscarriage
of justice" standard. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has explained, "[r]eversing a conviction on the basis of an error
that the defendant's lawyer failed to bring to the judge's attention is
inconsistent with the premises of an adversary system."' 134 Put an-
other way, the adversarial system depends upon each party's coun-
sel to insure that his or her client receives a fair trial. The Supreme
Court itself recognized this concern in Young.' 3 5 After explicitly
stating that the plain errior rule should be used "sparingly, solely in
those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would other-
wise result,"' 3 6 the Court maintained that "[a]ny unwarranted ex-
tension of this exacting definition of plain error would skew the
Rule's 'careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial partici-
pants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against
our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.' "1137
The "miscarriage of justice" standard for applying Rule 52(b) rec-
ognizes the premises of the adversarial system and is firmly
grounded in the purpose underlying plain error review.
Despite the apparent appropriateness of the "miscarriage of
justice" standard, the Olano Court rejected it in favor of the standard
laid down in Atkinson. 3 8 The Atkinson standard authorizes appellate
courts to correct errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity
(6th Cir. 1991) (describing plain error as "an egregious error, one that leads directly to
a miscarriage of justice"); United States v. Gollot, 939 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1991)
(defining "plain error" to be "mistakes so fundamental as to constitute a miscarriage of
justice"); United States v. Neumann, 887 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1989) (plain error rule
should be applied only when necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 949 (1990).
133 United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1111 (1985).
134 Id.
135 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
i36 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14
(1982)).
'37 Id. (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)).




or public reputation of judicial proceedings."1 39 Like many stan-
dards, the Atkinson standard and the miscarriage of justice standard
are nebulous at the boundaries, and it is difficult to articulate the
exact difference between the two. Nevertheless, as the Olano Court
noted for the first time, the two are not the same.140 Under the At-
kinson standard, unlike under the miscarriage ofjustice standard, the
plain errors that appellate courts can correct need not be so abso-
lutely vital to the defendant that the defendant was wrongly con-
victed; that is, convicted of a crime that, at least in the eyes of the
law, he did not commit.' 41 Under the Atkinson formulation, courts
rather than counsel are entrusted with insuring the fairness, integ-
rity, and public reputation of the judicial process. Under the miscar-
riage of justice standard, counsel shoulders most of that
responsibility, with the reviewing court stepping in only to avoid the
gross injustice of allowing the conviction of an innocent person to
stand.' 42 Although the two standards involve fundamentally differ-
ent conceptions of the importance of the adversarial system,' 43
Olano failed to address this issue.1 44
The Olano Court gave two reasons for adopting the Atkinson
standard. The Court maintained that the Atkinson standard was
"codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)"' 45 and that
"we repeatedly have quoted the Atkinson language in describing
plain-error review."' 46 Neither of these arguments is convincing
enough to warrant the abandonment of the miscarriage of justice
standard. The Court's claim that Rule 52(b) codified the Atkinson
standard is controverted by the Advisory Committee's Notes147 and
the Court's own statements in Young.' 48 The argument that the
139 United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
140 Oano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779.
141 Id. ("An error may 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings' independent of the defendant's innocence.") (quoting Atkinson,
297 U.S. at 160).
142 Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has, in
characteristic form, explained the rationale behind the miscarriage ofjustice standard in
economic terms: "The benefit of departing from the ordinary processes of adversary
justice is maximized when the departure is necessary to save an innocent person."
United States v. Caputo, 978 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1992).
143 See United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1111 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
144 0ano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779.
145 Id (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)).
146 Id. (citations omitted).
147 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) advisory committee's note. The advisory committee's note
cites Wiborg, not Atkinson. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
148 Young, 470 U.S. at 15 n.12. In Young, the Court noted that the Committee sought
to allow the courts of appeals to review plain errors so that" 'any miscarriage ofjustice may
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Court has "frequently quoted the Atkinson language" in describing
Rule 52(b) analysis implies that the Court has preferred the Atkinson
standard over the "miscarriage of justice" standard. Before Olano,
however, the Court had never recognized the conceptual differences
between the two standards. In Frady, the Court did not apply Rule
52(b) to the facts of the case and so never reached the question of
whether the Atkinson standard or the miscarriage ofjustice standard
was a more appropriate guide for determining when to reverse er-
rors under the Rule. 149 In Young, the Court quoted both standards
in its description of plain error review and decided that the error at
issue in the case did not warrant correction under Rule 52(b) be-
cause it did not "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial
and contribute to a miscarriage of justice." 150 In neither case did
the Court acknowledge that the two standards are similar but con-
ceptually distinct, 151 and in neither case did the Court express a
preference for the Atkinson standard over the miscarriage of justice
standard. 152 In light of the policy and history supporting the mis-
carriage ofjustice standard, the Court, in a case where the standard
for correcting plain errors was actually at issue, should have decided
that appellate courts should correct errors under Rule 52(b) "solely
in those circumstances in which a miscarriage ofjustice would other-
wise result."153
C. THE OLANO COURT'S AD HOC APPLICATION OF RULE 52(b)
As indicated above, the Olano Court addressed only the "affect-
ing substantial rights" issue when it applied the basic principles of
plain error review to the defendants' case. 154 The Court began its
inquiry into whether the presumed error of allowing alternate jurors
to remain in the jury room during deliberations "affected substan-
tial rights" by asking whether the presumed error was the kind that
" 'affect[s] substantial rights' independent of its prejudical im-
pact."'155 In other words, the Court was simply asking whether the
error at issue in Olano could somehow affect substantial rights with-
out necessarily being prejudicial. The majority needed to ask this
be thwarted.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. (Preliminary Draft
1943)).
149 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). See supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text.
150 Young, 470 U.S. at 16.
151 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
152 See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163; Young, 470 U.S. at 15-16.
153 Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 n.14.
154 See supra part V.A.
155 United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993).
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question because it declined to decide whether the phrase "affecting
substantial rights" is always synonymous with "prejudicial."' 156 Like
the decision not to determine whether the presence of alternate ju-
rors during jury deliberations was a "plain error" under Rule 52(b),
the decision not to determine whether "affecting substantial rights"
means "prejudicial" was an exercise ofjudicial restraint. That deci-
sion, however, leaves the appellate courts to determine for them-
selves on a case-by-case basis whether the prejudice inquiry is the
proper means of deciding if an error affected substantial rights
within the meaning of the Rule.
The Olano Court resolved the issue by noting that it had usually
"analyzed outside intrusions on the jury for prejudicial impact"'157
and then by deciding that it saw no reason to depart from this nor-
mal prejudice inquiry. 158 The Court gave no indication, however,
whether appellate courts were supposed to engage in a similar anal-
ysis each time they reached the substantial rights issue. It simply
answered the specific issue and then moved on to the prejudice
inquiry.
The Court's ad hoc approach to the substantial rights element
is consistent with the case-by-case inquiry that has characterized
plain error review since its common law inception.' 59 The case-by-
case analysis is also consistent with the vagueness of the phrase "af-
fecting substantial rights" and with the notion that Rule 52(b) is an
"exceptional" remedy requiring a careful review of the particular
facts of the case.' 60 It is not clear, however, whether the case-by-
case approach is consistent with the Olano Court's broader goal of
clarifying plain error review for the appellate courts. The Court did
not explain whether it was attempting to "formulate a test for plain
error that articulates the prejudice standard to be applied" or sim-
ply "reasserting the plain-error doctrine's lack of rigid defini-
tion." 61  The Court's narrow ruling certainly provides little
guidance to the appellate court judges who must determine whether
errors not involving "jury intrusions" require an inquiry into "prej-
udicial impact" to satisfy the substantial rights language of Rule
52(b).
156 Id. at 1778.
157 Id. at 1780.
158 Id.
159 See 3A WRIGHT, supra note 33 § 856.
160 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("Especially when addressing
plain error, a reviewing court cannot properly evaluate a case except by viewing such a
claim against the entire record.").
161 United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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The Court's discussion of whether the presence of alternate ju-
rors during jury deliberations is prejudicial is so bound to the facts
in Olano that it, too, is unlikely to be an appropriate model for ana-
lyzing other cases. 162 The Court decided that the presence of alter-
nate jurors during deliberations could have prejudiced the
defendants in two ways: either because the alternate jurors actually
participated in the deliberations with the regular jurors; or because
the alternates had a "chilling" influence on the regular jurors. 163
Such a narrowly tailored inquiry was not only appropriate but neces-
sary for resolving the prejudice issue in Olano, but that analysis is
not easily analogized to other cases. Both the nature of the pre-
sumed error and the record of the case are crucial to the Court's
conclusion that the defendants did not meet their burden of proving
prejudice. 164 Thus, the result, if not the intent, of Olano is the rein-
forcement of the case-by-case nature of plain error review. Olano
gives reviewing courts a four-part framework for analyzing Rule
52(b), but the application of at least one key element of that frame-
work is inextricably linked to the peculiar nature of "jury intru-
sions" and to the court's own judgment of those issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Olano, the Court correctly decided that the presence of alter-
nate jurors during jury deliberations was not an error that war-
ranted reversal of a verdict under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Court reached that conclusion, however,
by articulating a new, four-part framework for plain error analysis in
a case requiring the resolution of only a narrow issue. By focusing
on only one prong of the four-pronged test, the Court left appellate
courts with the task of determining how to apply most of the ele-
ments of its new framework. The Court's new framework also ex-
plicitly rejects the miscarriage of justice standard for applying Rule
52(b) in favor of the Atkinson standard. That decision disserves the
purpose of the plain error rule and forces appellate courts to decide
how to apply a standard that the Court did not clarify or apply in
Olano itself. In light of the uncertainties surrounding the Court's
new analysis and given the Court's own ad hoc application of the
substantial rights element of its new framework, it seems likely that
appellate courts will continue to decide plain error cases on a case-
162 See Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
163 Id. at 1780.
164 Id. at 1781.
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by-case basis despite Olano's attempt to articulate a formula for plain
error review under Rule 52(b).
JEFFREY L. LOWRY
